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Facsimile: (801)393-4004 
e-mail: dbhavas@havaslaw.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Ken 
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Appellant request oral argument and a published opinion. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff/Appellant generally agrees with Defendants/Appellees' Statement of Facts. 
However, the following needs to be set forth as additional facts: 
1. Mr. Claypoole testified at trial that, although he believed the first impact was 
harder, he was braced and was ready for the first accident, he was real tight for the first 
accident, but, for the second one, he just didn't see it coming and wasn't ready for it. R. 1623, 
p. 357, 358). 
2. Dr. Nelson testified at trial that Mr. Claypoole's symptoms of his low back 
condition were aggravated by the February 7, 2001 accident. (R. 1621, p. 159, 160). 
1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. CLAYPOOLE DID NOT WAIVE HIS OBJECTIONS TO VOIR DIRE 
Defendant would have the Court believe that plaintiff in the case at bar did not do 
enough to preserve his objections to the manner in which the jury was examined for voir dire. 
However, the opposite is true. The trial court made it abundantly clear that he was not going 
to submit a jury voir dire questionnaire to the jury, and was only going to allow follow up 
questions by counsel, notwithstanding the pronouncements of this court in the progeny of 
cases suggesting the use of extensive voir dire and suggestion on the use of Jury Voir Dire 
Questionnaires, State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58 (UT, 2001, f 31) [While it may be advisable for 
a trial court to use a jury questionnaire in certain situations, the trial court has "considerable 
latitude as to the manner and form of conducting the voir dire examination." case cited 
omitted], Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct.App.1991) [a trial judge should liberally 
allow questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both conscious and subconscious, 
even though such questions go beyond that needed for challenges for cause, Evans, 824 P.2d 
at 462, Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) [Inadequate voir dire 
substantially impairs a plaintiffs right to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges], 
Alcazar v. U of Utah Hospitals & Clinics, 188 P.3d 490 (Utah App. 2008) [A trial judge 
should liberally allow questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both conscious and 
subconscious, even though such questions go beyond that needed for challenges for cause. 
2 
Alcazar, 188 P.3d 490 ]f 10], [a trial court could elect to use a questionnaire to efficiently 
pose such questions to the jury panel, and judicial involvement would only be needed for any 
suggested follow-up questions. This form of questioning may help eliminate the potential for 
lengthy voir dire, Alcazar, 188 P.3d 490, note 1]. 
Here the court was asked on at least three occasions to allow a Jury Voir Dire 
Questionnaire to be submitted to the jury. On September 16, 2008 at the time of pre-trial, 
Plaintiff advised the court that he intended to submit a jury questionnaire: 
MR. HAVAS: One other matter I want to raise to the Court. I'm going to submit to 
the Court a proposed jury questionnaire. R. Partial Transcript of Pretrial Conference 
September 16,2008,3:10. 
Plaintiff continued to advise the court of the jury questionnaire: 
MR. HAVAS: And on the jury questionnaire when we agree on one, I ' l l submit that 
substantially before the jury instructions, etcetera. 
THE COURT: I am not going to submit a jury questionnaire to the jury, I'll tell you 
right now, but I ' l l look at your voir dire, okay? R. Partial Transcript of Pretrial 
Conference September 16, 2008, 4:3. 
The court was adamant that he was not going to submit a questionnaire to the jury: 
THE COURT: I'm not going to submit a questionnaire to the jury. 
MR. MINNOCK: Okay, well, we'll just do it as voir dire. 
THE COURT: But your welcome to do one if you want to preserve that on the record, 
but Ifm not going to submit a questionnaire to the jury, so keep that in mind. R. Partial 
Transcript of Pretrial Conference September 16, 2008, 4:6-18. 
Notwithstanding the court's pronouncement on not being willing to submit a jury 
questionnaire, Plaintiff submitted a Motion for Jury Questionnaire along with a supporting 
Memorandum citing the cases in support of a jury questionnaire and the need for extensive 
3 
jury voir dire. R. 1308-1314. Attached to the Memorandum was a proposed 28 question juror 
questionnaire. The short questionnaire was converted to Plaintiffs Requested Jury Voir Dire 
R. 1383, which was designed to ask open ended questions so that plaintiff could garner as 
much information about the potential jurors as possible. After the court's unequivocal 
pronouncements, it would have been futile to ask the court again to submit a questionnaire 
to the jury or to allow attorney conducted voir dire. 
The court conducted its voir dire in open court, with all members of the venire present. 
By the time that the court finished with his questioning of the venire, plaintiff was unable to 
get the members of the panel to open up and respond to his questions. Had the court asked 
his questions in such a fashion that members of the jury venire would have to answer by 
giving more than affirmative or negative answers, plaintiff may have been able to have the 
jury open up and plaintiff could have obtained information which would have helped him in 
exercising his peremptory challenges. As was observed in the Nevada case of Whitlock v. 
Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 752 P.2d 210 (Nev. 1988): 
...Moreover, while we do not doubt the ability of trial judges to 
conduct voir dire, there is concern that on occasion jurors may 
be less candid when responding with personal disclosures to a 
presiding judicial officer. 6 
6 For example, one study suggests that the judge's presence 
evokes considerable pressure among jurors toward conforming 
to a set of perceived judicial standards and that this is minimized 
when an attorney conducts voir dire. Jones, Judge—Versus 
Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire; an Empirical Investigation of 
Juror Candor, 11 Law and Human Behavior 131, 143-44 
(1987). 
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Whitlock,!52?.2d at 212. 
The Nevada court's pronouncement on the importance of an impartial jury is equally 
true in Utah. 
The importance of a truly impartial jury, whether the action is 
criminal or civil, is so basic to our notion of jurisprudence that 
its necessity has never really been questioned in this country. 
United States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908,911 (8th Cir.1974). 
The voir dire process is designed to ensure-to the fullest extent 
possible—that an intelligent, alert and impartial jury which will 
perform the important duty assigned to it by our judicial system 
is obtained. De La Rosa v. State, 414 S.W.2d 668, 671 
(Tex.Crim.App.1967). The purpose of voir dire examination is 
to determine whether a prospective juror can and will render a 
fair and impartial verdict on the evidence presented and apply 
the facts, as he or she finds them, to the law given. See Oliver v. 
State, 85 Nev. 418, 422, 456 P.2d 431, 434 (1969). We are 
convinced that prohibiting attorney-conducted voir dire 
altogether may seriously impede that objective. 
Id. 
The manner in which the jury was questioned as to underlying biases or prejudices 
substantially impaired Plaintiffs ability to challenge jurors for cause or to exercise his 
peremptory challenges and prejudiced plaintiff in his ability to select a truly impartial jury. 
Defendants/Appellees rely on the recent case of Boyle v. Christensen, __ P.3d _, 2009 
UT App241 (September 3,2009) as being dispositive of the issue of preservation of the issue 
for appeal. However, a close reading of Boyle would show that in Boyle plaintiff failed to 
submit briefing on the issues. 
Tfl2 Mr. Boyle argues on appeal that his mere submission of 
specific jury questions relating to damages and tort reform 
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preserves for appeal his claim that the voir dire questions the 
district court actually posed were inadequate. 
The Court of Appeals differentiated Boyle with Alcazar v. University of Utah Hosps. 
& Clinics, 2008 UT App 222, 188 P.3d 490 (Utah App 2008) and indicated: 
compare Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456,458 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(finding no preservation where a party failed to "call the judge's 
attention to [a] specific question" in a set of voir dire questions 
that had been rejected by the trial court), with Alcazar v. 
University of Utah Hosps. & Clinics, 2008 UT App 222, \ 5, 
188 P.3d 490 (addressing substantive issue where appellant had 
"repeatedly attempted to persuade the trial court to give the 
requested voir dire questions, including briefing the rather direct 
authority from this court on the issue, [but] the court declined 
and offered its own unique philosophical approach to voir dire 
in medical malpractice cases"). 
Boyle, supra 2009 UT App 241, If 12. 
Here, as in Alcazar, plaintiff attempted to warn the court of the error contemplated and 
submitted a detailed memorandum of the direct authority from the Utah Court of Appeals on 
the issue. The trial court's judgment should be reversed and this case should be remanded for 
a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
ALLOWED PLAINTIFF'S SETTLEMENT DEMAND LETTERFROM 
A PREVIOUS CIVIL CASE INTO EVIDENCE, WHICH THE 
DEFENDANT THEN USED FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES. 
Other than pointing out to the court that the settlement demand letter in the other case, 
prepared by Appellant's attorney, contained puffing in order to effectuate a settlement in the 
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other case. Allowing that kind of evidence in a separate case, is unfair and should not have 
been allowed. Other than this additional statement, Appellant relies on his arguments 
contained in his opening brief. 
POINT III 
THE TREAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
SUBMITTING A CONFUSING SPECIAL JURY VERDICT FORM TO 
THE JURY. 
Appellant pointed out to the trial court that the intent of the Utah Supreme Court is 
to use plain English injury instructions. The phrasing of the instructions in this case were 
confusing and whether counsel used these confusing phrases during trial or not, does not 
justify using them in jury instructions and thus make them unintelligible. The trial court 
should have instructed the jury in everyday English, not legalese. Other than this 
clarification, Appellant relies on his arguments contained in his opening brief. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff/appellant Ken Claypoole, respectfully requests the Utah 
Court of Appeals to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new 
trial. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this f_ day of November, 2009. 
' David Bert Havas, No. 1424 
DAVID BERT HAVAS, P. C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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